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Abstract
In this article, we propose a neurophenomenological account of what moods are, and how they work. We draw upon phe-
nomenology to show how mood attunes a person to a space of significant possibilities. Mood structures a person’s lived ex-
perience by fixing the kinds of significance the world can have for them in a given situation. We employ Karl Friston’s free-
energy principle to show how this phenomenological concept of mood can be smoothly integrated with cognitive neurosci-
ence. We will argue that mood is a consequence of acting in the world with the aim of minimizing expected free energy—a
measure of uncertainty about the future consequences of actions. Moods summarize how the organism is faring overall in
its predictive engagements, tuning the organism’s expectations about how it is likely to fare in the future. Agents that act to
minimize expected free energy will have a feeling of how well or badly they are doing at maintaining grip on the multiple
possibilities that matter to them. They will have what we will call a ‘feeling of grip’ that structures the possibilities they are
ready to engage with over long time-scales, just as moods do.
Keywords: mood; predictive processing; depression; phenomenology; error dynamics
Introduction
In what follows, we will propose a neurophenomenological the-
ory of what moods are—a core, but often overlooked aspect of
our first-person experience of the world. On the one hand, we
put phenomenological ideas to work to show how mood struc-
tures lived experience. On the other hand, we set out to show
how neurobiology can make sense of these phenomenological
descriptions of mood in the terms of the free-energy principle
(FEP) (Friston 2010). We call our account of mood, ‘neuropheno-
menological’ because it aims to smoothly integrate phenome-
nological description with cognitive neuroscientific
explanation. Our use of the term ‘neurophenomenology’ (here
abbreviated as ‘NP’) departs somewhat from that of Varela
(1996). He originally introduced the term to describe an experi-
mental method in which subjects in an experiment would be
actively involved in identifying invariant and structural features
of lived experience. In what follows, we do not draw our phe-
nomenological descriptions of experience from experiments but
instead base our descriptions on reflection on lived experience
and its disturbance in psychopathology. In developing a neuro-
phenomenological account of mood, we take as our starting
point the phenomenological concept of an agent’s tending to-
wards an optimal grip on the possibilities that matter to them
(Merleau-Ponty 1962/2012; Dreyfus 2005; Rietveld 2008;
Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014). In earlier work, we have shown
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how this phenomenological concept can be understood as a
consequence of anticipatory biological processes on the basis of
which living systems minimize their own free energy—an
information-theoretic measure of surprise or uncertainty. Our
aim in this article to establish whether the phenomenology of
mood can likewise be analysed in terms of tending towards an
optimal grip on a field of relevant action possibilities. We will
argue that mood is a consequence of acting in the world with
the aim of minimizing expected free energy. The key claim we
set out to defend is that any agent that acts with the aim of
minimizing expected free energy will have a feeling of how well
or badly they are doing at tending towards an optimal grip.
They will have what we will call a ‘feeling of grip’ that struc-
tures the possibilities they are ready to engage with over long
time-scales, just as moods do.
In the first (Mood as a phenomenological structure of lived ex-
perience) section, we sketch a phenomenological account of
mood (sometimes called ‘existential feeling’; Ratcliffe 2008). We
show how mood structures the agent’s lived experience of the
world by fixing the kinds of significance a situation has for them
as they engage with the world. In the second (The feeling of grip)
section, we revisit arguments developed in earlier work that the
tendency towards an optimal grip can be thought of as arising out
of an imperative to minimize free energy all living beings share in
common. This allows us to frame the question which will occupy
us in the remainder of the article of whether the phenomenology
of mood can also be analysed in terms of tending towards an opti-
mal grip. The third (How mood tunes prediction) section describes
how mood can be understood in terms of momentum in mini-
mizing expected free energy. Moods we suggest, summarize how
the organism is faring overall in its predictive engagements, and
tune expectations about how the organism will fare in the future.
We suggest such an account of mood amounts to a redescription
of the phenomenological account of mood in the terms of the
FEP. In the fourth (Hopelessness and anhedonia in major depres-
sion) section, we show how our neurophenomenological account
of mood might explain some key aspects of the lived experience
(e.g. anhedonia and the loss of hope) that people can experience
in major depression.
Mood as a Phenomenological Structure of
Lived Experience
In everyday lived experience, a person’s mood reflects how they
find themselves in the world. The existence of a living being is
never carefree. We always find ourselves in one mood or an-
other because there is always some way in which the world
matters to us. Even boredom and indifference are ways of find-
ing ourselves situated in relation to the world. Heidegger’s term
Befindlichkeit captures the phenomenology of mood well
(Heidegger 1927/1962). The reflexive verb befinden is used to say
how and where one finds oneself in relation to the world—it
might for instance be used in responding to the question ‘How
are you?’ (Colombetti 2014, 12). The situation in which we find
ourselves can be pleasant, unpleasant, fascinating or boring,
comforting or disturbed, safe or threatening and so on. These
are descriptions of possible ways in which the world can matter,
or be of significance to a person. A situation can show up as be-
ing significant to the person in these ways only because of the
mood the person finds themselves in.
Moods are not internal subjective mental states that have as
their cause external states of the environment. They arise out of
our being in the world (Heidegger 1927/1962, 176). Imagine you
are walking alone on a dark night in an unfamiliar part of town
when you feel the presence of a stranger following you. The situa-
tion as a whole is all of a sudden experienced as one fraught with
threat. Our emotion of fear is directed at the person following us,
but only because the situation as a whole is experienced as
threatening (Heidegger 1927/1962, 180). Threat in this example
describes something of how you find yourself in the world. It is a
mood that structures how you experience your current situation,
and the kind of significance the situation as a whole takes on.
Ratcliffe offers a detailed analysis of the phenomenology of
mood in terms of bodily feelings that situate an individual in
the world, orienting them in a space of possibilities. For
Ratcliffe moods fix the kinds of significance the world can be
encountered as having, opening or closing the individual to spe-
cific possibilities (Ratcliffe 2008; c.f. Fuchs 2013). In the previous
example, it is because you feel threatened that the world can be
encountered by you as dangerous. Danger here is the kind of
significance the situation can have because the situation you
find yourself in is threatening. Ratcliffe’s talk of bodily feeling
should be distinguished on the one hand from emotional states
like fear, sadness or anger that involve some explicit appraisal
or evaluation of the subject’s relation to the world. Emotions are
sometimes felt in the body. They include what is sometimes
called ‘core affect’ made up of arousal and valence components
(Russell 2003). However, bodily feelings as Ratcliffe uses the
term have a pre-reflective or background status—they make
possible the full-blown emotional states a person can have.
Think again of the example of the threatening situation—mood
describes the way you find yourself situated in the world.
Feeling threatened is a kind of concern on the basis of which
one can experience an emotion such as fear of some particular
thing or person (Heidegger 1962; Ratcliffe 2008). It is because our
ways of caring about the world include being threatened that
particular things can show up for us as being dangerous, and
thus elicit an emotion of fear. Moods understood as pre-
reflective background bodily feelings open us to a world of sig-
nificant possibilities, a world with which we are involved, and
in which we can feel more or less at home.
The notion of bodily feeling Ratcliffe uses to describe the
phenomenology of mood should likewise be distinguished from
bodily sensations such as itches, pains or tickles. (We thank an
anonymous reviewer for emphasizing the importance of this
distinction.) Bodily sensations are the more or less subtle
changes sensed at specific locations in the body from the inside.
Bodily feelings however need not be localized bodily experience
but can consist in a ‘general sensitivity to the world’ (Slaby
2008). Moreover, bodily feelings need not be discrete episodes
with a more or less well-defined, dateable beginning and end.
They can arise in the course of our wider activities, structuring
our overall style of engagement with the world. Bodily sensa-
tions can sometimes structure the person’s sense of what is
possible. Think of how pain for instance can infuse your overall
experience of your situation, shrinking your openness to the
world and the practical possibilities it offers. People that suffer
with migraine for instance, sometimes say all they can do is
hide away in a dark room. The distinction between bodily feel-
ings and sensations is thus not always sharp. It is nevertheless
a distinction it is important to observe if we are to use the no-
tion of bodily feeling to understand the phenomenology of
mood as Ratcliffe proposes. Many sensations are localized
bodily episodes like itches that occur without the sensation
structuring the person’s overall sense of the kinds of possibili-
ties the world offers. Bodily sensations can occur that do not in-
corporate any world-directedness beyond what the person
senses in their body. Moods by contrast arise out of a person’s
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being in the world, making manifest how a person is faring in
their engagement with the world. Lauren Freeman describes
the phenomenology of mood well when she writes: ‘We are in
moods with the entirety of our being, and out of our moods the
world as a whole is disclosed to us’ (Freeman 2014, 453).
Moods have been analysed in philosophy as ‘generalized
emotions’ that lack a clear focus because they are directed to-
wards the world as a whole, not towards particular objects (see
e.g. Solomon 1993, 71). The difference between mood and other
emotions is that moods provide a general colouring or tone to
emotional experience. In psychology moods are typically under-
stood as long-lasting, internal states of subjects that differ from
emotions only in their duration and lack of a specific object they
are directed towards (see e.g. Ekman and Davidson 1994, and for
critical discussion, Freeman 2014). Such a conflation of mood
with emotion cannot be correct if mood is what makes it possi-
ble for things to be of emotional significance to us. Without
mood there would be no emotion. If the world lacks practical sig-
nificance for a person for instance, as it does in some experien-
ces of major depression, the emotions of hope or worry about
some practical project and its outcome no longer make sense.
The depressed person literally experiences a world without hope
in which no projects call out as worth pursuing (Ratcliffe 2015).
Mood we suggest structures lived experience by entailing an
anticipation-fulfilment structure for lived experience. Think of
the feeling of hope that takes root after an interview for a big
project grant goes really well, and one comes to expect a posi-
tive outcome. Then the disappointing news is received that the
application was unsuccessful. Binswanger describes the experi-
ence well when he writes how ‘the world—in one stroke—
becomes “different”’ (Binswanger 1975, 222–3). The meaningful
possibilities one anticipated as on the horizon, immediately fall
away. As a further example familiar to many of us, consider
Ractliffe’s example of feeling at ease in teaching a class one has
prepared carefully in advance. He describes how one experien-
ces the class situation as a whole as the ‘confident, unproble-
matic anticipation and fulfilment of various significant
possibilities’ (Ratcliffe 2017, 164). One’s engagement with the
class is characterized by a ‘diffuse feeling of ease or confidence’
(Ibid.). Ratcliffe’s example is an illustration of a skill-based un-
derstanding we bring to every encounter with the world on the
basis of which we have an experience of belonging, or being at
home in the world.
In the next section, we begin the work of making sense of
this phenomenological conception of mood in neurobiological
terms. We aim to show how the anticipation-fulfilment struc-
ture of lived experience can be mapped onto the anticipatory
dynamics of free-energy minimizing systems that tend towards
an optimal grip in their engagements with the world. The ques-
tion we take up in the rest of our article is whether the role of
mood in shaping the anticipatory structure of lived experience
can likewise be understood in terms of the dynamics of free-
energy minimization.
The Feeling of Grip
The FEP posits that all systems that maintain their organization
in their exchanges with a dynamic environment will minimize
their own free energy. The principle was formulated by Karl
Friston to understand the organizational properties of complex
biological systems, from plants and single cells all the way up to
humans, and the social networks they form with each other
(Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston 2010, 2013; Allen and Friston
2018). What these biological processes all share in common is
that they show self-organizing behaviour. They are open systems
in which global order arises through the coupling of the sys-
tem’s internal dynamics to the external dynamics of the sys-
tem’s econiche. Second, and relatedly, all of these biological
processes are adaptive systems that maintain their organiza-
tion when perturbed from the outside. FEP purports to identify
the organizational properties a complex adaptive system must
have if it is to preserve its organization for an extended and pro-
longed period of time in a dynamic environment. What behav-
iours must the system select—how must it act—if it is to
continue to exist, and stay away from catastrophic phase transi-
tions (destructive changes in its organization)? In this section,
we revisit our ecological-enactive interpretation of the FEP with
the aim of bringing out how FEP calls into question any dualistic
separation of bodily feeling from life. (Our ecological-enactive
interpretation of FEP is developed in more detail in earlier
articles co-authored with Jelle Bruineberg—see Bruineberg &
Rietveld 2014, Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld 2018.) FEP as we
will interpret it implies that complex adaptive systems must be
agents with their own concernful point of view on the world.
Feelings (and we will eventually argue, mood) grow smoothly
out of such concern.
2.1. The FEP: an ecological-enactive reading
The FEP takes as its starting point the observation that any com-
plex adaptive system must actively regulate its behaviour so as
to remain in a dissipative, far from thermodynamic equilibrium
steady state (Friston and Stephan 2007). Complex adaptive sys-
tems are by definition, systems that are able to stay away from
thermodynamic equilibrium—a state of a physical system in
which there is no exchange of matter and energy either within
the system, or with the environment. Thermodynamic equilib-
rium means death for living systems: a system isolated from ex-
ternal influence will, in accordance with the second law,
increase in disorder or entropy over time. Complex adaptive
systems keep entropy to a minimum by for instance finding the
energy they need to fuel their actions. To endure for any period
of time, living systems must at the same time negotiate a
changing environment so to avoid destructive phase transi-
tions. They must for instance avoid extremes of temperature or
pressure that threaten their continued integrity. More generally,
they must act selectively on the environment in ways that fit
with change in their surroundings.
The FEP states that the actions any complex adaptive system
should select are those that minimize surprising or improbable
sensory exchanges with the environment. The internal states of
a complex adaptive system can be described in terms of an at-
tractor landscape—a set of attractor states the system tends to
revisit regularly over time under a wide range of initial condi-
tions (Friston 2012). The set of attractor states for the system
will be internal states that are highly probable given the sys-
tem’s phenotype and the kind of niche it inhabits. In the FEP,
the internal states of the system are said to be a ‘model’ of the
system’s ecological niche by means of which the system can
steer its actions. The purpose of the model is to anticipate per-
turbations imposed by the ecological niche so that the system
can adapt its actions appropriately. For this reason, we have de-
scribed the generative model as a ‘system of anticipations’ (see
(Bruineberg & Rietveld 2019). (We should note this is perhaps
not the standard way of understanding the generative model.
The generative model is standardly understood as functioning like a
map that encodes statistical regularities on the basis of which the
organism can infer the hidden causes of its sensory signals
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(Gladziejewski 2016; Kiefer and Hohwy 2017). (See Ramstead et al.
(2019) for a critique of this standard understanding of the gener-
ative model, and an enactive reading of ‘model’ talk in line
with the one we assume in this article.) The model in steering
the system’s action generates exteroceptive, proprioceptive
and interoceptive sensory states that form a narrow region of
the state space that defines the possible sensory states of the
system. Sensory states that fall within this region are unsur-
prising and expected, while sensory states that fall outside of
this narrow region are improbable for the system, and thus are
surprising, or unexpected. To remain well adapted to its envi-
ronment, the system should avoid sensory exchanges that are
surprising, and sample the environment for sensory outcomes
that are expected. Organisms however have no tractable way of
calculating the surprise value (or improbability) of their sen-
sory states. The FEP says organisms get round this problem by
using free energy as an upper bound on surprise. Free energy is
always greater than surprise. Thus by keeping free energy to a
minimum biological systems will also succeed in minimizing
surprise (Friston 2010, 2012).
The FEP in a nutshell ‘states that all the quantities that can
change (i.e. that are a part of the system), will change to mini-
mize free energy’ (Friston and Stephan 2007). These quantities
are the internal dynamics (e.g. the parameters of the agent’s in-
ternal model biologically realized as weights and biases in the
system’s neural dynamics if it has a brain), and the external dy-
namics in the environment which the agent intervenes in
through its actions. The result of minimizing the free energy of
its internal dynamics is that the agent’s internal dynamics will
be well adapted to causal regularities in the environment. The
model can be used to steer the agent’s actions because the out-
comes that are anticipated based on the model are ones that
closely approximate what happens when the agent acts. The or-
ganism will thereby tend on average to avoid surprising and im-
probable sensory states. By minimizing the free energy of its
internal dynamics, the system will also keep surprise to a limit.
The second quantity that can change so as to minimize free
energy is the external dynamics that describe the agent’s inter-
action with its environment. We take the external dynamics to
describe the dynamics of the agent’s eco-niche. Through its
actions the agent can change the structure of the environment,
bringing about sensory states that match those the agent
expects given its internal dynamics. The agent will selectively
sample the space of possible sensory inputs for those sensory
outcomes it expects to encounter. The sensory outcomes the
agent expects will be fixed by the agent’s phenotype and the
ecological niche it grows up in. So long as the agent succeeds in
fulfilling its expectations through its actions, it will typically
find itself in sensory states that are unsurprising, avoiding im-
probable sensory encounters that are a threat to its viability. By
minimizing the free energy of its external dynamics, the agent
will thereby bound the surprise value of its sensory states.
The FEP posits that so long as the internal and external dy-
namics change over time to minimize free energy, the result
will be that the organism will remain well adapted to its niche.
We have seen above how the FEP states how a living system
should act if it is to remain viable in a changing environment.
The actions the organism should select if it is to minimize free
energy are the actions likely to lead the organism to remain
well adapted in its engagement with the ecological niche, and
thus to flourish. Free energy thus quantifies how well or badly
the organism is doing in its engagement with the environment.
Organisms should (if they are to succeed in minimizing free en-
ergy over time) self-regulate their coupling with the
environment. They should continue on a promising path when
all is going well, or when things are going better than expected.
They should shift to doing something else when things are not
going as well as expected. If they are to minimize free energy,
organisms should develop an internal dynamics geared to steer-
ing them in the direction of flourishing.
2.2. The tendency towards an optimal grip
So far in this section, we have described how living systems
should actively regulate their engagement with the world so as
to minimize free energy because doing so will maximize the
probability of their own flourishing in their niche. Crucially, a
system that modulates its engagement with the environment
according to its sense of how well it is faring can be said to have
an ‘inner life’—a point of view on its environment relative to
which it can make distinctions between doing better or worse,
well or badly. The FEP thus calls into question any separation of
the inner life of the organism from its biological organization.
We have seen above how any system that succeeds in minimiz-
ing free energy will regulate its engagement with its niche on
the basis of its own inner sense of how it is faring. Nor does it
make sense to separate the behaviour of the organism from its
sense of how well or badly it is attuned to what it cares about in
its environment. The sensory states the organism aims to bring
about through its actions correct for deviations from the organ-
ism’s own flourishing in its niche. This state of flourishing can
be thought of as an optimum for the organism. The organism
senses its deviation from this optimum and acts to move closer to-
wards an optimal relation to its ecological niche. We call this
dynamic ‘the tendency towards an optimal grip’, drawing upon
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of maximal prise (Merleau-Ponty 1962/
2012).
Consider as an illustration, Merleau-Ponty’s description of
the relation the football player takes up to the other players and
the football field in a game of football. Merleau-Ponty describes
the football field as ‘pervaded by lines of force (the ‘yard lines’;
those which demarcate the ‘penalty area’) and articulated in
sectors (for example the ‘openings’ between the adversaries)
which call for a certain mode of action’ (Merleau-Ponty 1942/
1963, 168). The different regions of the pitch and the other play-
ers are marked out for the player as inviting specific actions
more or less appropriate to what is happening in the game as it
unfolds. There are a near open-ended number of possible
actions available to the player. Of the possible actions the player
could perform, some stand out as to be done here and now as
the game unfolds. Others concern the directing of the future
course of the game as an attack builds. Still other actions are
just not relevant possibilities at all in the player’s current situa-
tion, such as lying down on the grass in the midst of the game
to take a nap.
We suggest it is based on their sense of how they are cur-
rently faring as a skilled player that affordances stand out as in-
viting in the game. We borrow the term ‘affordance’ from the
ecological psychologist James Gibson using the term for the pos-
sibilities for action the environment makes available (see
Gibson 1979, chapter 8). To be more precise, we define affordan-
ces as relations between aspects of the socio-material environ-
ment in flux and the abilities available in a form of life (Rietveld
& Kiverstein 2014; Van Dijk & Rietveld 2016). So we use the term
‘affordance’ in a broad sense—the affordances of the human en-
vironment are as rich and extensive as the skills and abilities
available to humans. We call relevant affordances that stand
out as calling for action, ‘invitations’ (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007;
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Withagen et al. 2012). The skills the player has developed give
them a feel for how well or badly things are going in the game,
both at a given moment in time and looking ahead into the fu-
ture (Rietveld 2008). They have an immediate felt appreciation
for what would be required for things to go better. It is on the
basis of this feel for the game that the affordances unfolding in
the game stand out as inviting, calling to them to take a certain
course of action. In responding to inviting affordances agents
tend towards an optimal grip; they can be ‘moved to improve’
by these invitations (Rietveld 2008). Certain affordances stand
out as inviting because the agent deviates from an optimal rela-
tion of equilibrium with the environment. Affordances are invit-
ing when they move the agent closer towards equilibrium—
when they enable the agent to improve its grip on the possibili-
ties that matter to them as a skilled agent.
Humans are skilled at acting in many different contexts and
situations. They have grown into and become skilled partici-
pants in a multiplicity of different practices in their everyday
life. They thus have a multiplicity of different (and sometimes
conflicting) cares and concerns that feed into their sensitivity to
how they are faring in their practical engagement with the
word. The person will thus always be readying themselves for
acting on several relevant affordances. The multiple relevant
affordances the individual is ready to engage with form a struc-
tured field in dynamic flux. In acting to minimize free energy,
the skilled individual will be ready to act in ways that are re-
sponsive to a whole field of relevant affordances.
The question we take up in the remainder of our article is
whether the tendency towards an optimal grip on a field of rele-
vant affordances can account for the phenomenology of mood.
Can we use the tendency towards an optimal grip to explain
how mood can structure the person’s sense of what is signifi-
cant in the situation they find themselves in? Anticipation we
have been arguing should be thought of in terms of free-energy
minimization. The significance the individual experiences their
situation as having should therefore fall naturally out of an
agent that is sensitive to how well or badly they are doing in
minimizing free energy. We explore how this might work in the
remainder of our article.
HowMood Tunes Prediction
We have seen in the first (Mood as a phenomenological struc-
ture of lived experience) section how the mood a person finds
themselves in structures the kinds of significance they experi-
ence in a given situation. Is the notion of ‘inviting affordances’
sufficiently broad in its application to cover the many kinds of
significance the individual can experience? Ratcliffe has argued
it is not. He claims that the notion of affordance is too coarse-
grained to capture the different ways in which a situation can
appear meaningful to an individual (Ratcliffe 2015, 61; c.f. Dings
2018; Ratcliffe and Broome, forthcoming). A situation can be ex-
citing or boring, comforting in its familiarity or disturbing in its
strangeness. A situation can be of interpersonal significance of-
fering up possibilities for conversation, and friendship, pride or
shame. Ratcliffe has argued that such differences in the signifi-
cance a situation can have cannot be understood in terms of the
way in which affordances can invite action. Ratcliffe’s critique
stems from his restricting his focus to the invitation of a single
affordance, and the attractive or repelling quality of an individ-
ual affordance. We would argue however that inviting affordan-
ces do not have significance taken in isolation from the
structure of the field of relevant affordances as a whole. It is to
the structure of the field as a whole that we should look for an
account of the kinds of significance Ratcliffe takes moods to
disclose.
For the person experiencing hopefulness, for instance, the
field will have a structure with temporal depth, in which the fu-
ture offers the promise of many inviting possibilities. For a per-
son experiencing boredom, the field will be structured so that
the immediate situation offers nothing of interest. We’ve sug-
gested that the field of relevant affordances has the structure it
does because of the individual’s skills and their immediate felt
sense of how well things are going in their dynamic engage-
ment with the world. We propose to think of mood as giving an
individual a feel for how well or badly they are gripping to the
field as a whole. On the basis of this feeling, the situation as a
whole is experienced as having a particular significance.
3.1. Error dynamics track grip
When you ask a person how their day is going they will likely
answer by giving a general overall sense of how they are doing.
They say they are doing well or badly or perhaps just fine. They
are indicating something about how they find themselves in the
world given what matters to them. We suggest this overall
sense of how well or badly things are going is based on expecta-
tions of how free energy is likely to change over time. It has re-
cently been proposed that the positive or negative valence of
emotions can be understood in terms of the rate of change in
free energy (Joffily and Corricelli 2013; for a related proposal see
Van de Cruys 2017; Kiverstein et al. 2019; Miller et al. 2020). The
negative valence of fear maps onto free energy increasing faster
over time. The positive valence of hope maps onto free energy
decreasing at a fast rate. We will refer to the change in free en-
ergy over time as ‘error dynamics’ because free energy is a mea-
sure of the mismatch between the sensory states the agent
expects given the generative model it embodies, and the sen-
sory states it comes to occupy. Whenever there is a mismatch
detected and thus a change in free energy, this is because the
agent’s expectations are in error. (When we use the term ‘error’,
we do not mean this term to be understood in a semantic sense.
It is common in the literature on the FEP to interpret the genera-
tive model as encoding prior beliefs with semantic content.
Error can thus be interpreted as a consequence of the generative
model failing to represent the hidden external causes of sensory
input correctly. We suggest by contrast an understanding of er-
ror in terms of pragmatic success—error has the consequence
that the agent fails to adapt its actions adequately to its eco-
niche.) Change in free energy over time can thus be thought of
in terms of error dynamics—how fast or slow error increases or
decreases over time.
The FEP states that the generative model the organism
embodies aims to keep free energy to a minimum over time.
Error dynamics can thus be thought of as providing feedback for
the organism about the quality of the generative model it
embodies. This feedback informs the organism of how well or
badly the model is doing at adapting the organism to its eco-
niche. More specifically, the change in the quantity of free en-
ergy can be used by the agent to track volatility or uncertainty
about the temporal evolution of states in the environment
(Joffily and Coricelli 2013). Free energy increases or decreases
with environmental volatility. The more volatility there is esti-
mated to be in the world, the more uncertain the agent should
be about acting. Thus error dynamics can be used as a proxy for
uncertainty about the outcome of actions. Fear for instance
is experienced by an agent in a situation in which free energy is
increasing at an accelerating rate. Increasing free energy is
How mood tunes prediction | 5
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nc/article/2020/1/niaa003/5850359 by guest on 26 August 2020
equivalent to accumulating surprise. It signifies that the sen-
sory evidence the agent has sampled fails to match what the
agent anticipates given the model it embodies. The agent
should not rely on such a model to steer its actions—it cannot
be confident that the actions it selects will lead to the sensory
outcomes it prefers. Now contrast this with the situation in
which the agent is hopeful because free energy is being reduced
fast. The agent can in this situation be confident that the
actions it selects will lead to the preferred outcomes it expects.
Free-energy minimizing agents should not only care about
uncertainty in the present but should in addition make use of
their past experiences to keep track of future or expected free en-
ergy. We have seen how free-energy minimizing agents expect
to do well and flourish in their niche. They act in ways that aim
to fulfil this expectation. They face the challenge of how to tran-
sition from their current situation at time t0 (e.g. hunger) to their
preferred state at some future time t1 (e.g. digesting a nutritious
meal). We have seen above how the multiple affordances stand
out as inviting are the affordances the agent anticipates will
lead them from their current situation (at t0) to the sensory out-
come in the future (at t1) they expect. The agent’s present situa-
tion provides sensory evidence that favours to differing degrees,
a selection of the action possibilities available to them. The
agent must select affordances that minimize expected free en-
ergy—the difference between the sensory states the agents
expects to sample in the future (i.e. those that are associated
with a state of flourishing or well-being, e.g. being well-fed), and
those attainable from their current situation. The affordances
that minimize expected free energy should stand out as rele-
vant to the agent and as inviting action.
Following Joffily and Coricelli (2013), we suggest that error
dynamics can be used as a measure of the likely performance of
an action policy. Joffily and Coricelli (2013) base their hypothesis
on the simulation of an agent that learns to maximize reward in
playing against a one-armed bandit slot machine under varying
conditions of volatility. One agent explicitly estimates the vola-
tility of environmental states (the probability of reward), while
the other agent relies on what we have called error dynamics—
the change in free energy over time. They show (among other
things) how the agent that uses error dynamics to track volatil-
ity can not only match the performance of an agent that explic-
itly estimates volatility but can also out-perform such an agent
when shifting from conditions of low to high volatility. They
write ‘With the addition of emotional valence to the model, the
agent becomes even more reactive and is able to track fast
changes in the environment’ (p. 7).) Insofar as the agent is aim-
ing at minimizing future or expected free energy, they must
somehow keep track of whether the free energy of their current
sensory states and the free energy of their future sensory states
increases at a faster or slower rate than expected as a conse-
quence of their actions. It is an important and (to our knowl-
edge) open question how the tracking of error dynamics might
be neurobiologically implemented. Work on active inference
suggests that neurotransmitters such as dopamine will do part
of this work (Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Friston et al. 2012, 2014;
Schwartenbeck et al. 2015a,b). Dopaminergic midbrain regions
are widely accepted to play a role in tracking reward prediction
errors (see e.g. Schultz et al. 1997)—they track whether the out-
comes of the individual’s actions were better or worse than
expected. Thus when an animal receives more food than
expected this is strongly correlated with dopaminergic change
in the nucleus accumbens (Hart et al. 2014). A similar response
was found in humans when they performed better than
expected in a financial reward task (Rutledge et al. 2010).
In work on active inference, the dopamine system is taken to be
a part of a complex dynamical system that optimizes precision
expectations through learning. (This process of optimization is
given a neurobiological characterization in terms of optimizing
the sensitivity of post-synaptic gain of cells. Phasic discharges
in the dopamine system are hypothesized to signal error in pre-
cision expectations. Tonic discharge of dopamine is hypothe-
sized to influence the post-synaptic gain on such error signals
leading to an update of precision expectations (Friston 2012,
276).) We have suggested above that active inference is the pro-
cess of selecting the relevant affordances that are expected to
minimize the mismatch between current and future sensory
inputs the agent expects to occupy so long as it is flourishing.
Dopaminergic discharges weigh the agent’s confidence in rele-
vant affordances given the agent’s skills and abilities (Friston et
al., 2012; Miller, Kiverstein & Rietveld 2020; Kiverstein, Rietveld,
Slagter & Denys 2019; Linson, Clark, Ramamoorthy, & Friston
2018).
We are suggesting the dopaminergic system is part of a com-
plex system sensitive to changes in the rate of error reduction.
Weighing the precision of relevant affordances is work best
done in part through keeping track of error dynamics (Miller
et al. 2020). Information about rate of change in error reduction
is valuable feedback that can be used to fine-tune precision esti-
mations. If the dopamine system is implicated in the process of
precision estimation (as is suggested by Friston et al. 2012;
Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Schwartenbeck et al. 2015a,b), dopaminer-
gic neurons should keep track of error dynamics. (We focus
above on the role of the dopamine system in enabling the per-
son’s sensitivity to error dynamics because the precision esti-
mation has been shown to map onto reward learning systems
in the brain (see e.g. Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Schwartenbeck et al.
2015a,b). The recent literature on active inference suggests how-
ever that there may be multiple ascending neuromodulatory
systems involved in estimating precision. Parr and Friston
(2017) hypothesize that cholinergic projections to the cortex
may track precision of expected outcomes given states of world,
while noradrenergic systems track the precision of state transi-
tions or unexpected uncertainty arising from environmental
volatility.)
By using error dynamics to weigh the precision of relevant
affordances, the agent can maximize the probability that the
sensory states it brings about through its actions are ones that
minimize expected free energy. To see this, consider how to min-
imize expected free energy the agent must maximize the pre-
dictive success of the model it instantiates (c.f. Phillips 2013). It
is only if the agent can accurately and precisely forecast the fu-
ture sensory consequences of its actions that the agent will suc-
ceed in selecting the relevant affordances most likely to
minimize expected free energy. (See Hesp and colleagues’ (pre-
print) for a detailed computational analysis of the role of va-
lence in the process of selecting actions that minimise expected
free energy. Their account of affective valence complements
well the account of mood we develop in this article.) Using error
dynamics as feedback will therefore help to maximize the qual-
ity of the generative model and its predictions. It will ensure
that the agent continually makes progress in developing its
skills, and actively seeks out sensory states that are not so com-
plex as to be unpredictable, nor so simple as to be fully predict-
able no longer allowing the agent to learn anything. (Evidence
that this is indeed the strategy free-energy minimizing agents
deploy comes from research on learning progress in develop-
mental psychology and robotics. Thus Kidd et al. (2012) show
that 7- to 8-month infants show a preference for sequence of
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events that are neither too predictable as to bore them, nor too
complex so that they are unable to predict them. They were
most likely to look away when complexity was either too high
or too low, and prefer to look at sequences that are novel
enough to hold their interest. The enjoyment of novelty helps
the infant to continually make progress in learning, allowing for
the learning of a generative model able to manage a dynamical
environment over increasingly longer periods of time. This hy-
pothesis is borne out by work in epigenetic robotics in which
progress in learning is associated with an intrinsic reward, and
the robotic agent is motivated to act in ways that maximize this
reward (Oudeyer and Smith 2016). For further discussion, see
Kiverstein et al. 2019.) An agent that aims to continually make
progress in its predictions will tend to be drawn into action by
relevant affordances that maximize the probability of its contin-
ually improving its grip on the possibilities that matter. By max-
imizing the predictive success of its model, the agent will thus
maximize the probability of its own flourishing (Kiverstein et al.
2019).
3.2. Mood as momentum in free-energy reduction
We suggest that positive and negative moods can be thought of
as a reflection of the overall momentum or expected direction in
error dynamics. (We base this proposal on work by Eldar et al.
(2016). They frame their hypothesis in terms of reward learning
but reward can be shown to map onto expected sensory states
using the FEP as we briefly explained above. (For a more detailed
account see e.g. Friston et al. 2009). James Clark in a co-authored
paper with Friston has proposed an account of mood that con-
verges with the one we are outlining (Clark et al. 2018). Like us,
they propose to understand mood in terms of expected free en-
ergy. Clark et al. suggest that emotions track uncertainty about
the consequences of action—the precision with which motor
and physiological states consequent on action can be predicted.
Moods they argue are expectations about uncertainty that de-
termine how emotions change over time. Thus, the low mood
people experience in major depression they conceptualize as
certainty that the person will encounter an uncertain, volatile
environment. In anxiety disorders (which they distinguish from
major depression), the person expects with low confidence to
encounter a volatile and unpredictable environment. Finally,
Clark et al. show how in mania a person may expect with high
confidence positive (expected rewarding) outcomes of their
actions. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing
our attention to the work of Clark et al.) Moods are expectations
of rate of change in free energy. They are projections for the
agent of how well or badly their activities are likely to go in the
future.
By ‘momentum’ we mean the expected rate of error reduc-
tion over time. We use ‘momentum’ to refer to a general trend
in free-energy reduction. Given their past experience, can an
agent expect a future in which free energy will be reduced at an
accelerating or at a decelerating rate? A positive mood like hap-
piness depends not only on things going well, but on them go-
ing better than you had expected (Rutledge et al. 2014). Positive
mood consists in an expectation of positive momentum in
expected free-energy minimization. The agent expects that
given its current situation free energy will decrease at an accel-
erating rate as a consequence of their actions. This biases up-
ward their estimation of the probability of relevant affordances
leading to preferred sensory outcomes. This upward biasing of
expectations makes perfect sense in a natural world with all
kinds of intermeshing regularities. For example, rewards are
commonly interconnected, and often occur contiguously. A
good rainy season means more food all around; spring means
more food, while winter means food scarcity (Eldar et al. 2016).
There is thus an adaptive advantage to allowing local successes
and failures to help tune more global expectations about
rewards. If for example, we find berries on a few bushes in a
row, perhaps this means spring has arrived. In that case, we
may benefit from updating our expectations about future berry
finding in the area as a whole (not just on individual bushes).
Positive mood provides feedback for the organism of the
overall, global trend in how it is faring, and whether or not the
organism can expect to experience good times going forward
into the future. A few experiences of positive (i.e. expected) out-
comes in a row will lift mood, which if all goes well should steer
the organism in the direction of expecting free energy to con-
tinue to decrease in the future. Similarly when one does not
have a good grip on a given situation, perhaps because the situ-
ation is too complex, momentum in free-energy reduction will
be negative. One will start to expect more failures and further
increasing disattunement. In this case, negative mood provides
feedback indicating the problematic overall negative trend in
momentum. By tracking rate of change in free-energy reduction
mood provides feedback that allows an agent to take into ac-
count general trends and the ‘impact of multiple environmental
factors’ without having to calculate the individual impact of
each factor (Eldar et al. 2016).
Given the structuring of expectations by moods , a rigidifying
of either positive or negative mood will have detrimental conse-
quences for the person’s well-being. A rigid positive mood will
sooner or later lead an agent to fail to anticipate which affor-
dances to engage to bring about preferred outcomes. Negative
mood can enable an agent to engage flexibly and adaptively
when things change by bringing expectations of opportunities
for free-energy reduction back in line with reality. At some
point, all the berries will have been consumed from the bushes.
Thus, to continue to seek berries in a particular location will no
longer serve the agent well. Negative moods signal negative
momentum—the agent expects acceleration in the increase of
free energy as consequence of their actions, leading to the bias-
ing downwards of estimations of the precision of an inviting
affordance (e.g. searching for berries on these very bushes).
When opportunities to improve grip begin to diminish in this
way, the ensuing negative mood allows our expectations to
quickly tune to the unreliability of relevant inviting affordances
for improving grip in the current circumstances.
So far we have been describing how mood may bias individ-
uals to weigh precision in ways that maximize opportunities for
the minimization of expected free energy. This would mean
that when in a positive mood individuals should be more sensi-
tive to and on the lookout for affordances that predict positive
momentum—an acceleration in free-energy reduction. They
will sample the environment for opportunities that confirm this
expectation of a positive trend, predicting in extreme cases an
overall state of flourishing in the future. This biasing of atten-
tion by positive mood in a dynamically changing environment
will however inevitably lead to surprise. Joffily and Corricelli
(2013) suggest it is a signature feature of positive mood under-
stood in terms of error dynamics, that it will tend in the end to
lead a person to overlook important changes in the environ-
ment (p. 4). The effect of this failure to attend to change will be
an accumulation of error which will lead to negative affect, and
a consequent swing to negative mood—an expectation of decel-
eration in the reduction of free energy. If the rate of change in
free energy is greater than the individual expects (i.e. if there is
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a deceleration in free-energy reduction), this should grab their
attention. They should begin to explore their environment on
the lookout for opportunities to do better. As the person begins
to fare better and free energy begins once again to decrease, this
should feel good. Eventually, this will result in a swing to a posi-
tive mood when momentum takes a turn in the direction of ac-
celeration in free-energy reduction.
Indeed, we suggest that a positive mood should be associ-
ated with a higher learning rate (i.e. high estimates of precision)
for negative outcomes. By ‘negative outcomes’ we mean
breaches in expected positive rate of change or acceleration (i.e.
violation of expected continued momentum; c.f. Eldar et al.
2016, 7). Positive mood has been shown to dominate in healthy
individuals (Diener and Diener 1996). Healthy individuals typi-
cally enjoy what is referred to as an ‘optimism bias’ (Sharot et al.
2016). The reason for this, we speculate, lies in part in the dy-
namic we have just described. Positive mood induces in individ-
uals the expectation of continued trend of acceleration in free-
energy reduction. At the same time, they fail to attend to
changes in their circumstances which have the consequence
that free energy begins to accumulate and momentum shifts
downwards. Learning from negative momentum means the
agent will be quick to recalibrate their expectations in a down-
ward direction. Once their expectation for acceleration in free-
energy reduction is brought down, it will become easier for
them to find their way to opportunities for meeting those
expectations. The result of this will be the agent begins to do
better than expected and returns once again to a positive mood.
Thus they will tend to spend more of their lives in a positive
than negative mood.
To illustrate this virtuous circle induced by positive mood,
suppose that a person expects to be an A student. They feel con-
fident in their ability to learn. However, when they arrive at uni-
versity they find they are now a C student. This would have the
consequence that each time they encounter the same event (re-
ceiving a C on another paper assignment) this would result in
negative surprise (feedback that they have done worse than the
expected A grade). They start to feel bad, and this leads them to
adjust their expectations of their own performance. Negative
mood that arises from doing worse than expected (i.e. failing to
fulfil their optimistic expectation of receiving an A) should, we
hypothesize, lead to progress in learning. They start to expect to
do badly, which in turn allows them to learn new strategies for
improving their performance. This will allow them to benefit
from incremental improvements relative to their actual (not
just expected) skill level. They might for instance develop new
action policies for studying. This will, if all goes well, in turn
generate positive surprises, and thus improve their mood as
their grades incrementally improve from the C they have begun
to expect back up towards the performance of an A grade
student.
When moods are functioning well in a free-energy minimiz-
ing regime, the strength and duration of the mood will fluctuate
with rising and falling opportunities for minimizing expected
free energy. The result of this tracking of momentum will be a
tuning of a model that enables the agent to continuously tend
towards an optimal grip on the field of relevant affordances as a
whole. When things are going well, the agent will tend to con-
tinue on the same path. When things begin to take a turn for
the worse, so also will their mood. Thus, the individual will be
moved to do things differently, or even switch to doing some-
thing else, which will if things go well help to restore their
fortunes.
However, changes in mood can only contribute to this im-
proved grip when they help to shift upward or downward the
agent’s precision estimations (i.e. the confidence the agent has
that a relevant affordance is likely to lead to its expected state
of flourishing). Precision estimates should ideally track the
probability of an affordance leading to outcomes the agent
expects. The agent’s confidence should march in step with the
actual possibilities for minimizing expected free energy, or
catch-up when such estimations fall behind (i.e. when the agent
does worse or better than expected). As we have noted above,
positive moods should persist only as long as the general trend
is one in which the environment is providing better than
expected opportunities to flourish. To offer an extreme exam-
ple, research shows that lottery winners only enjoy a brief pe-
riod of elation before returning to basically the same sense of
wellbeing they had before they won (Brickman and Campbell
1971; Brickman et al. 1978; c.f. Van de Cruys 2017).
Not adjusting confidence when one’s circumstances take a
turn for the worse can lead to serious dysfunction. For example,
if an activity (for instance using a drug) repeatedly does better
than expected at reducing free energy, then this activity will be-
gin to stand out as highly inviting and salient. The activity will
over time tend to be repeated more and more. This is what hap-
pens in substance addiction, where for example opioids act on
the precision estimation circuitry in the midbrain so as to rein-
force drug-seeking action policies (Schwartenbeck et al. 2015a;
Miller et al. 2020). The result is that the drugs of addiction attract
the user in increasingly powerful ways, while other opportuni-
ties for reward (social relationships, career, nutritious food, etc.)
are increasingly ignored to the detriment of the organism.
People grow up to expect a good relationship with family, a suc-
cessful career, and operate with a biological expectation for
food when hungry. Addiction leads to all of these expectations
being frustrated, and thus to a pervasive build-up of free energy.
Yet despite these negative outcomes, the affordances the use of
the drug offers continue to be estimated as a good bet for mini-
mizing expected free energy. It is this rigidification of the
agent’s drug-using action policy, and the failure of the precision
that is given to this policy to keep up with the overall downward
momentum in the addict’s fortunes that can make addiction
pathological. We can think of this in terms of the shrinkage of
the field of relevant affordances to only those affordances that
relate to the use of the addictive substance.
Major depression can arise when an agent operates with
overly rigid expectations of positive momentum in free-energy
reduction. The agent fails to correct its expectations when mo-
mentum turns negative, as we will discuss in more detail in the
next section. The failure to recalibrate their expectations leads
to a negative, and vicious circle of the opposite kind to that seen
in healthy individuals that tend to consistently return to a posi-
tive mood. The depressed individual continues to expect an un-
realistic positive momentum of free-energy reduction. They do
so because unlike healthy individuals they exhibit a low learn-
ing rate for negative momentum. As long as they do not adjust
their expectations of free-energy reduction downward, the
world will continue to frustrate their efforts at acting in ways
that allow them to flourish. Failing to flourish will become un-
surprising to them. Such an agent will soon find themselves
locked into a vicious cycle in which nothing they do contributes
to bettering their situation. If the agent continues to meet the
world with such expectations, no affordances will call to them
as likely to lead to good outcomes. They will experience a field
of relevant affordances in which everything is flat and nothing
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in particular stands out as worth doing either in the present, or
going into the future.
Hopelessness and Anhedonia in Major
Depression
Solomon in writing about his first-person experience of major
depression tells us: ‘the first thing that goes is happiness. You
cannot gain pleasure from anything’ (Solomon 2002, 19). The
person experiencing major depression expects that nothing
good could happen. Affordances that would previously have
been inviting to the agent (e.g. succeeding at work, eating a fine
meal) begin to appear less inviting, and so cease to draw the or-
ganism into action in the same way.
The persistent low mood associated with major depression
we propose to understand in terms of negative momentum in
expected free-energy minimization. We suggest low mood per-
sists and rigidifies because the agent exhibits the opposite pro-
file to healthy individuals—they exhibit a low learning rate for
negative momentum in free-energy reduction. Evidence of low
learning rate for negative momentum in depressed individuals
comes from work showing that low serotonin makes people in-
sensitive to negative outcomes (Bari et al. 2010; Eldar et al. 2016).
This low learning rate results in overly rigid optimistic expecta-
tions. The person acts with expectations of free-energy reduc-
tion the world consistently fails to meet. An anonymous
reviewer objected we must be mistaken in attributing overly op-
timistic expectations to people with major depression. The re-
viewer rightly observed that people with major depression
show a pathological under confidence in the predictions of the
outcomes of their actions coupled with a deep lack of self-
worth. We are suggesting however that it is their harbouring of
overly optimistic expectations that leads them to lack self-
worth, and to have low confidence in their own abilities. For ex-
ample, the person may expect parents that love and care for
them but encounter only parental abuse and violence. The re-
peated frustration of their expectations of a nurturing home en-
vironment would lead to persistent and recurring error, and
thus to low mood. Moreover, the frustration of this expectation
for a stable and safe home environment is one they cannot
change through their actions. Nothing they do seems to make
any difference. Thus operating with what turns out to be an
overly optimistic expectation will lead to an increase in free en-
ergy over time, and thus to low mood. While their low mood
persists, they will continue to expect only uncertainty and thus
to lack confidence in themselves and in the opportunities for
flourishing the world offers (c.f. Clark et al. 2018). Some of these
expectations may come from their phenotype and concern bio-
logical imperative like living in a safe and nurturing social envi-
ronment that are frustrated by for example parental abuse and
neglect, or growing up in a warzone. Normally this breaching of
expectations would eventually lead to a recalibration—to an ex-
pectation of deceleration in free-energy reduction. But we sug-
gest that because of low learning rate for negative momentum
in free energy reduction this recalibration fails to occur. They do
not adjust their expectations for positive momentum which
means they don’t find their way to opportunities to do better in
the way that healthy individuals do. Typically if an agent
expects free energy to increase as a result of their actions, they
will explore for alternative possibilities they can instead rely
upon to lead them towards the outcomes they desire. When
they find such affordances they will get the feedback that things
have gone better than expected, and this improvement in
fortune should over time translate into an improvement in
mood. Recall again our example of the student above who had
adapted his or her expectations so as to better make progress in
their learning. But for the depressed individual none of this
takes place. Instead they meet the world expecting only nega-
tive, unpredictable outcomes—they ready themselves for a
world that is threatening to their well-being. (We see this in the
physiology of the person in the hyperactivity of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis—the body stress re-
sponse—and in proinflammatory immune activity that produce
sickness behaviours aimed at reducing energy expenditure
(Barrett et al. 2016).)
The source of the problem is low learning rate for negative
momentum. The failure to update unrealistic expectations for
free-energy reduction leads to rigidification of low mood. This
has the consequence that the person’s precision estimates fail
to march in step with the natural rises and falls in free energy
that are a part of every individual’s engagement with a dynamic
environment. Their persistent low mood means they fail to an-
ticipate where the opportunities for improving grip are to be
found. At this point an enduring feedback loop may emerge,
driven by top-down expectations, whereby the organism begins
to sample the environment in ways that confirms their de-
pressed outlook. There is an important temporal progression to
take note of here in the formation of this feedback loop. Low
mood initially results from violations of expectation of positive
momentum in free-energy reduction. Over time, the person
comes to expect violations of such optimistic expectations—
they come to expect not to flourish. This tipping point arguably
marks the end of an adaptive low mood. At the outset of depres-
sion, low mood will often lead the person to take actions that
improve their situation. Low mood can allow for the conserva-
tion and reallocation of energetic resources which can serve as
an adaptive strategy for minimizing expected free energy in a
threatening highly stressful, volatile, social environment
(Barrett et al. 2016; Badcock et al. 2017; Clark et al. 2018). Rigid low
mood however leads to what Badcock and colleagues have de-
scribed as a ‘self-perpetuating cycle’, a positive feedback loop in
which the persons samples the social world for sensory obser-
vations that confirm their expectation of suffering. One of the
subjects (#75) Ratcliffe interviews tells him: ‘When I’m de-
pressed life never seems worth living. I can never think about
how my life is different when I’m not depressed. I think my life
will never change and that I will always be depressed’ (Ratcliffe
2015, 69). The result of the rigidification of low mood is that the
person doesn’t only experience a bad day every now and then,
but they experience a loss of the possibility that the future could
ever be good again.
First-person accounts of major depression often include
descriptions of the person’s worldview shifting in important but
difficult to express ways. A common experience that character-
izes the phenomenology of major depression is a loss of depth,
or a shrinking of the field of relevant affordances (De Haan et al.
2013). For the depressed person nothing seems interesting, no
activity or event provokes a desire to engage. The ordinary
scope for possible interactions with the world and others
becomes greatly reduced. The world seems devoid of possibili-
ties for improving their situation. Importantly, it is not only that
the world lacks alluring things, it is that the possibility of being
allured by affordances that contribute to the person’s well-
being seems to have been altogether removed (Ratcliffe 2013,
586). The loss of this dynamic push-and-pull between the agent
and the world that is ubiquitously felt in ordinary healthy expe-
rience produces a profound sense of estrangement—the
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depressed person and the world cease to fit together as they
once had, the result is a feeling of strangeness, alienness or sep-
arateness. People will describe ‘being cut-off from an interper-
sonal world and stranded or incarcerated for all eternity in a
different kind of world or reality’ (Ratcliffe 2015, 65).
This shrinking to nothing of significant possibilities can nat-
urally be redescribed in terms of the affective structure of the
field of relevant affordances as a whole (c.f. De Haan et al. 2013,
2015). We have shown above how inviting affordances stand
out as relevant to an agent as a result of an increase in free en-
ergy the agent expects it can control through its actions.
Precision we have been arguing, is estimated in part on the ba-
sis of error dynamics, and the expected deceleration or acceler-
ation in free energy consequent on acting. The global
downregulation of precision on affordances that happens
through persistent low mood means that affordances that once
solicited engagement will no longer invite as strongly, or at all.
Notice however, that a pathological low mood in major depres-
sion signifies not only that one has lost confidence in particular
affordances, but rather that there is a more global downregula-
tion of expectations about any affordance succeeding at reduc-
ing error in the given environment. If the agent no longer has
confidence in any of the affordances the environment offers
them, this will have the consequence that they relate to a field
of relevant affordances that is flat. This is arguably a difference
in the kind of possibility the world can make available. The very
possibility of anything standing out as significant is missing
from their experience, and as a consequence, nothing calls
them to action, except perhaps opportunities to end their life
(Krueger and Colombetti 2018).
Badcock et al. (2017) propose that depressed mood can arise
from the failure to attune to complex social niches, or more spe-
cifically, from the failure to share a reality with others. We sug-
gest that a part of this social complexity might have to do with
overly optimistic expectations for free-energy reduction, which
the challenges of the person’s life circumstances conspire to
frustrate. To offer another example, overly high expectations
about success might be installed and sustained from family or
culture. This would have the effect of setting precision weight-
ing on a slope of error reduction that is much too high given the
individual’s skills, abilities or environment. The result of not liv-
ing up to those expectations would be negative surprise. In
healthy and adaptive individuals, those errors would adjust pre-
cision expectations about the likelihood of future successes.
However, depressed individuals, as we have already noted,
learn to live in a world that offers only social distress. The fail-
ure to adjust to shifts in error dynamics can thus prove to be
catastrophic for the person. When a person is bombarded by
pathological negative surprise, or expects to always fail in their
attempts at error reduction, they lose a sense of being able to
improve in the ways that matter. The result is an experience of
a world in which nothing matters—a world lacking in
significance.
Conclusion
The neurophenomenological account of mood we have outlined
in this article is premised on a synergy of ideas drawn from the
FEP, affective neuroscience and phenomenological philosophy.
Looking at minds from this vantage point brings together the bi-
ological, psychological, phenomenological and the social. We
began by sketching the phenomenological account of mood due
to Ratcliffe. The phenomenology of mood can be described in
terms of the kinds of significance a situation has for a person.
Moods are existential feelings that structure and give style to a
person’s lived experience. It is because of the mood a person is
in that the situation they are in appears to have the significance
it does—i.e. threatening, or foreboding, exciting or boring. We
have set out to show how our ecological-enactive reading of the
FEP provides tools for redescribing the phenomenology of mood
in the terms of cognitive neuroscience. Mood we suggested can
be described in terms of expectation of momentum in free-
energy minimization. When in a positive mood, an individual
will expect positive momentum. They will expect the environ-
ment to offer plentiful opportunities for new and exciting ways
to live a fulfilling life. Thus positive mood biases expectations of
how the agent will fare in its engagement with the world up-
wards. We suggest this is an example of how mood could struc-
ture the significance the individual experiences a situation as
having.
Crucially, the individual’s positive mood will typically only
continue as long as they continue to do well in keeping
expected free energy to a minimum. If free energy begins to ac-
celerate, this will typically lead to a change in mood for the
worse. When in a negative mood, an individual will expect neg-
ative momentum—the acceleration in the increase of free en-
ergy. They will expect to fail at finding opportunities for
improving grip which may lead them to employ tricks that help
to lift their mood (e.g. meeting with a friend or playing music;
Colombetti and Krueger 2015). Again this is an example of how
mood might work to structure an individual’s sense of the sig-
nificance of the situation they are in.
When mood becomes rigidified and ceases to keep up with
the changing fortunes of an individual, the result can be a pro-
found change in the possibilities the individual anticipates. In
major depression for instance, a fixed low mood leads the per-
son to experience a world emptied of its meaningfulness.
Typically, precision is continually being tuned by our sensitivity
to error dynamics, which we take to arise as part of our skilful
engagement with the continually shifting field of affordances.
The hopelessness experienced in major depression arises in
part as a consequence of a breakdown in this process. In our or-
dinary healthy engagement with the world, we see the world as
a place where we can progress, learn and grow. We are ‘built’ to
grow in our skilled engagement with the world, and are happy
and engaged only to the extent that we succeed in doing so.
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